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A big challenge in continuous variable quantum key distribution is to prove security against arbitrary coherent
attacks including realistic assumptions such as finite-size effects. Recently, such a proof has been presented in
[Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 100502 (2012)] for a two-mode squeezed state protocol based on a novel uncertainty
relation with quantum memories. But the transmission distances were fairly limited due to a direct reconciliation
protocol. We prove here security against coherent attacks of a reverse reconciliation protocol under similar
assumptions but allowing distances of over 16 km for experimentally feasible parameters. We further clarify
the limitations when using the uncertainty relation with quantum memories in security proofs of continuous
variable quantum key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most advanced quantum information technology is
quantum key distribution (QKD), which is the art of using
quantum properties to distribute a secure key between two re-
mote parties. Its challenge lies in the combination of state
of the art experimental implementations and newly developed
quantum information theoretic principles to ensure its secu-
rity. There exist two different implementations both of which
have different benefits. More established is the encoding of
the information in a quantum system with discrete degrees of
freedoms, as, e.g., the polarization of a photon. Such dis-
crete variable protocols are usually based on single photon
sources and detectors with the latter suffer from low efficiency
at room temperature and being susceptible to loopholes (see,
e.g., [1, 2]). The advantage of such protocols is that condi-
tioned on the arrival of a single photon, the channel noise is
generally weaker allowing for long distances.
An alternative implementation encodes the information into
the quadratures of the electromagnetic field (see the recent re-
view [3] and references therein). Since the quadratures have a
continuous spectrum they are called continuous variable QKD
protocols. Compared to discrete variable protocols, they are
based on variants of homodyne detection which is a robust
and efficient measurement technique already used in current
telecommunication systems. Although CV QKD systems are
secure against blinding attacks, they are particularly vulnera-
ble to manipulations of the phase reference signal (local oscil-
later) (see, e.g., [4, 5]). Since the information is directly en-
coded in the phase and amplitude of the laser beam, the fiber
losses severely damp the transmitted signal and with that the
encoded information. Nevertheless, it was shown in [6] that a
key can be generated for arbitrary losses using reverse recon-
ciliation protocols. This has recently also been experimentally
demonstrated against restricted attacks [7].
Up to recently, the security of continuous variable QKD
protocols has only been analyzed in the asymptotic limit as-
suming an infinite number of communication rounds (see,
e.g., [6, 8, 9]). For protocols based on a Gaussian phase
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and amplitude modulation this simplifies the security analy-
sis tremendously. For instance, so-called collective attacks in
which each signal is attacked independently and identically
are as powerful as general (coherent) attacks [10]. Moreover,
it has been shown that Gaussian collective attacks are optimal
among all collective attacks [11, 12]. But these powerful re-
sults can no longer be applied if finite-size effects due to only
a finite number of communication rounds are considered. And
furthermore, even under a restricted set of collective Gaussian
attacks a significantly lower key rate is obtained for feasible
block lengths [13].
A big challenge in continuous variable QKD is to prove se-
curity against coherent attacks including all finite-size effects.
Since the Hilbert space of the system is infinite-dimensional
certain techniques that are standard for discrete variable secu-
rity proofs cannot be applied. For instance, the exponential
quantum de-Finetti theorem [14] or the post-selection tech-
nique [15] that are used to lift security against collective at-
tacks to security against coherent attacks do not directly apply
in infinite dimensions (c.f. [10]). Recently, the post-selection
technique has been extended in order to apply it to continuous
variable QKD [16], but its practical implementation relies on
a cumbersome symmetry step which is unpractical for real life
applications.
Another promising approach has been presented in [17]
which is based on a newly extended uncertainty relation in-
cluding the effect of entangled observers [18, 19]. The corre-
sponding protocol is based on the distribution of entangled
two-mode squeezed states and homodyne detection imple-
mented in [20]. The uncertainty relation allows to bound the
information of an eavesdropper Eve solely by the correlation
strength between the honest parties Alice and Bob. It has thus
the advantage that no tomography, or equivalently, quantum
channel estimations are necessary with the consequence of not
relying on collective attacks. But in [17, 21] only losses up to
20% could be tolerated since a direct reconciliation protocol
has been used. Moreover, the potential and limitations of the
proof technique have not been fully investigated.
Here, we show that using a reverse reconciliation protocol
significantly higher losses of over 50% can be tolerated en-
abling transmission distances of over 16 km including finite-
size effects. This makes the protocol suitable for practical
short distance continuous variable QKD providing security
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2against coherent attacks. The security proof has the advantage
that it does not require any assumptions on Alice’s measure-
ment device and is thus one-sided device independent.
Compared to [17], the reverse reconciliation protocol re-
quires Bob to apply a test to control the energy of the in-
coming signal. The test is based on a beam splitter to reflect
a negligible part of the signal which is then measured with
a heterodyne detector. We then show that conditioned that
the outcomes of the heterodyne detector are sufficiently small
the probability of Eve using a large energy attack can be ne-
glected. This test further allows one to overcome the problem
that homodyne detectors only operate faithfully in a limited
detection range. Moreover, we provide a new statistical es-
timation procedure that enables us to deal with high energy
signals which was not possible in [17].
We also clarify the theoretical limitations of the proof tech-
nique based on the extended uncertainty relation. In particu-
lar, we provide the optimal key rate in the asymptotic limit of
an infinite number of exchanged signals and without statistical
uncertainty. Unfortunately, it turns out that even under these
ideal conditions the tolerated losses are limited. An investi-
gation of the asymptotic key rate for a broad range of contin-
uous variable protocols based on the uncertainty relation has
recently been given in [22].
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section II by
introducing the security definitions and the classical part of
the protocol. This enables us to give a general formula for the
key rate presented in (4). In Section III A, we discuss the ex-
perimental setup and how the raw key is formed. The different
steps of the protocol are then listed in Section III B together
with the assumptions. The main result is Theorem 1 which
gives the explicit formula for the key length. In Section III C,
we present plots of the key rates for experimentally feasible
parameters. The security analysis is given in Section IV. The
tightness of the security proof is analyzed in Section V. Even-
tually, we conclude our results in Section VI.
II. SECURITY OF A QKD PROTOCOL AND FINITE-KEY
RATE
A. Security Definitions
A generic QKD protocol consists of two phases. The first
phase is given by the quantum part and includes the transmis-
sion and measurement of the quantum system. The second
phase is purely classical and consists of the extraction of a se-
cure key from the measured data by means of classical post-
processing. In the following, we consider an entanglement
based scenario in which the source is trusted and located in
Alice’s laboratory. She then sends one part of the quantum
system through a quantum channel to Bob. It is always under-
stood that Alice’s and Bob’s laboratory’s are closed, that is, no
unwanted information can leak to an eavesdropper. Once all
quantum systems are distributed, Alice and Bob perform mea-
surements to obtain the data from which the raw keys XA and
XB are formed. At the same time a parameter estimation test
is done which concludes whether one proceeds with the key
extraction or one aborts the protocol. Since the key generation
is a statistical process, one can assign a probability ppass to the
event that the parameter test is passed.
Given that the parameter estimation test is passed, Alice
and Bob proceed with the classical post processing to generate
the final keys SA and SB , respectively. Here, SA and SB
are classical random variables which might be correlated with
a quantum system E hold by an eavesdropper. We denote
the associated classical-quantum state by ρSASBE . The state
ρSASBE can conveniently be written as a classical quantum
state
ρSASBE =
∑
sA,sB
p(sA, sB)|sA, sB〉〈sA, sB | ⊗ ρsA,sBE , (1)
where the classical values for the keys sA and sB are associ-
ated with orthonormal states |sA, sB〉 in a Hilbert space. Here,
p(sA, sB) denotes the distribution of keys and ρ
sA,sB
E the
quantum state of the eavesdropper conditioned on SA = sA
and SB = sB .
We characterize a quantum key distribution protocol by its
correctness and secrecy. For that we use a notion of security
which is composable and based on the approach developed
in [23–25]. A protocol is called c-correct if the probability
that SA is not equal to SB is smaller than c:
Pr[SA 6= SB ] ≤ c . (2)
Roughly speaking, a protocol is secret if the key SB is almost
uniformly distributed and completely uncorrelated to Eve’s
system E. The ideal state is thus given by uSB ⊗ ρE , where
uSB denotes the uniform distribution over all keys and ρE is
the reduction of the state (1) to system E. We then say that a
protocol is s-secret if
(1− ppass) ‖ρSBE − uSB ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ s , (3)
where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the trace norm and the infimum is taken
over all possible states of Eve’s system. Eventually, a proto-
col is called sec-secure if it is c-correct and s-secret with
c + s ≤ sec. Note that the above security definition is com-
posable in the sense that security is guaranteed if any part of
the key is used for any other cryptographic protocol. This fol-
lows from the monotonicity of the trace distance.
B. Classical Post-Processing
As discussed in the previous section, the classical post-
processing transforms the raw keys XA and XB into the fi-
nal keys SA and SB . In the first step of this post-processing
an information reconciliation protocol is applied to diminish
the discrepancy of XA and XB . It was shown in [6] that it
is beneficial for continuous variable QKD protocols to use a
reverse reconciliation scheme in which Alice corrects her raw
key XA in order to match XB . This is especially crucial for
long distance QKD. Throughout this paper, we assume that a
one-way reverse reconciliation protocol is used in which `IR
bits of information about XB is sent to Alice via an authenti-
cated classical channel. Given this information andXA, Alice
outputs a guess XcA of XB .
3In order to ensure correctness (2) for the raw keys XcA and
XB (and thus for the keys), Bob applies a random function
of a family of two-universal hash functions [26, 27] onto an
alphabet of size 1/c on XB . He then sends Alice over an au-
thenticated public channel a description of the applied func-
tion together with the obtained value. This leaks additional
log 1/c bits of information, where the logarithm is always
taken to base 2. Alice applies the function to her corrected
raw key XcA and checks if the obtained value matches with
the one from Bob. If this is the case, they proceed with the
protocol otherwise they abort [28]. This then ensures that the
generated key is c correct.
In a second step of the classical post-processing the raw
key is hashed to a sufficiently small alphabet by means of a
family of two-universal hash functions such that the key is
sec-secure. Let us assume that the output of the hash func-
tions is a bit string of length `sec . For finite-dimensional E
systems it has been shown in [29, 30] that the length of the
bit string `sec can be expressed by the smooth min-entropy
Hmin(XB |E) which is related to the maximal probability that
Eve guesses XB correctly (see Section IV A). This result has
been extended in [31] to the case where Eve’s system E is
modeled by an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, which is
necessary for applications to continuous variable systems. In
particular, it holds that if  ≤ (s − 1)/(2ppass),
Hmin(XB |E)ρ − `IR − log
1
21c
+ 2 (4)
is a tight lower bound on the key length `sec with sec = c+s
(see, e.g., [32] for details). The state ρXBE for which the
smooth min-entropy is evaluated corresponds to the classical-
quantum state describing the joint state of Bob’s raw key XB
and Eve’s system E conditioned that the protocol passes. The
goal of the security analysis is to obtain a tight lower bound
on (4) using the data collected in the parameter estimation
step.
III. THE PROTOCOL AND KEY RATES
A. Experimental Setup and Generation of Data
The protocol is similar to the one in [17] and consists of
the distribution of an entangled two-mode squeezed state and
homodyne detection first proposed in [33]. But additionally,
Bob performs a test in order to estimate whether the incoming
signal exceeds a certain energy threshold. This test allows one
to exclude high energy eavesdropping attacks and to restrict
onto a bounded measurement range. This is crucial in order to
do finite statistics with reliable error bounds. The test requires
only two additional homodyne detectors.
The source is assumed to be in Alice’s laboratory and gen-
erates a two-mode squeezed entangled state often referred to
as an EPR state. This can be implemented by mixing two
squeezed modes over a balanced beam splitter [34]. The im-
portant characteristic of a two-mode squeezed state is that
there are two quadratures with a phase difference of pi/2 for
s
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FIG. 1. The diagram shows the measurement setup of Bob’s test
T (α, T ). He mixes the incoming signal with a vacuum mode a us-
ing a beam splitter with very low reflectivity 1 − T and applies a
heterodyne detection on the reflected signal a′. The test then con-
sists of checking whether the absolute value of the outcome of the
amplitude measurement of mode t1 and the phase measurement on
t2 is smaller than α.
which the two modes are highly correlated. We call these
quadratures amplitude Q and phase P in the following. Alice
then keeps one mode in her laboratory and performs at ran-
dom an amplitude or phase measurement using a homodyne
detector, where the probability for phase is 0 < r < 1. The
other mode is sent through a fiber to Bob who is as well per-
forming randomly an amplitude or phase measurement with
probability 1 − r and r, respectively. Due to the property of
a two-mode entangled state, Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
outcomes are highly correlated if they both perform amplitude
or phase measurement and uncorrelated otherwise.
Before Bob measures amplitude or phase of the incoming
signal he performs an energy test. In particular, he mixes the
signal with a vacuum mode a using a beam splitter with al-
most perfect transmittance T . The reflected signal a′ is mea-
sured via heterodyne detection, that is, mode a′ is mixed with
another vacuum mode b by a balanced beam splitter and ho-
modyne detection is performed to measure amplitude of one
output qt1 (mode t1) and phase pt2 of the other output (mode
t2). The setup is illustrated in Figure 1. Bob then simply
checks whether |qt1 | and |pt2 | is smaller than a prefixed value
α for every incoming signal and aborts otherwise. In the fol-
lowing we denote the corresponding test by T (α, T ). In Sec-
tion IV B, we show that conditioned that T (α, T ) passes the
probability for large amplitude and phase measurements can
be bounded.
While theoretically the spectrum of a homodyne measure-
ment is the real line, any practical implementation is limited
by a certain precision. We account for that by grouping out-
comes into intervals of length δ, where δ should be larger than
the precision of the homodyne detector. We then choose an
M ≥ 0 smaller than the detector threshold and group the mea-
4surements into intervals
I1 = (−∞,−M + δ] ,
Ik = (−M + (k − 1)δ,−M + kδ], k = 2, ..., 2M/δ − 1 ,
I2M/δ = (M − δ,∞) ,
where we assume that 2M/δ is in N. We thus associate with
any measurement result a value in X = {1, 2, ..., 2M/δ}.
It is important for the protocol to have high correlations be-
tween Alice’s and Bob’s outcome in the index set X . But due
to losses in the fiber, Bob’s amplitude and phase quadratures
QB and PB will be damped. In order to account for that, we
scale the quadrature measurements of Alice’s detectorQA and
PA before grouping them into the intervals using the transfor-
mations
QA 7→ Q˜A = tqQA and PA 7→ P˜A = tpPA . (5)
The scaling factors tq and tp ≤ 1 are adjusted according to
the channel losses in the transmission of the mode to Bob.
For the following, we also need a function to measure the
strength of the correlations between two strings X,Y ∈ XN .
For that we introduce the average distance
d(X,Y ) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|Xk − Y k| . (6)
We further define the average second moment of the differ-
ence between the strings by
d2(X,Y ) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|Xk − Y k|2 . (7)
Moreover, we define average second moment for the dis-
cretized phase and amplitude measurements X ∈ XN by
m2(X) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
(Xk −M/δ)2 . (8)
Here, we subtract M/δ since in the absence of an eavesdrop-
per the average value of X will be (approximately) M/δ such
that m2(X) simplifies to the variance. This holds because the
first moments of the amplitude and phase measurements in the
absence of Eve are 0, which implies that the first moments of
the discretized value will be approximately M/δ.
B. The Protocol
The protocol depends on the total number of prepared two-
mode squeezed states Ntot, the probability that Alice and Bob
perform a phase measurement r, the interval length for the
data generation δ, the threshold parameters α and M (see
Section III A), and a fixed value d0 > 0 used in the param-
eter estimation test. All classical communication is assumed
to be authenticated. The different steps in the protocol are as
follows.
1. Distribution & Measurement: Alice prepares Ntot two-
mode squeezed states and sends half of it to Bob upon
which both measure for each mode phase with proba-
bility r and amplitude with probability (1 − r). More-
over, Bob applies the test T (α, T ), that is, he checks if
|qt1 |, |pt2 | ≤ α is satisfied for all of the Ntot incoming
modes and aborts the protocol otherwise (see Figure 1).
2. Data Generation: Alice and Bob publicly announce
their basis choice. We count with n and k the number
of events in which Alice and Bob both chose amplitude
and phase measurement, respectively. From the mea-
surement with the same basis choice, they use the am-
plitude and phase measurements to formXA andXB in
Xn, and Y PEA and Y PEB in X k according to Section III A.
Alice and Bob further form a string containing all dis-
cretized phase measurements denoted by Y PA and Y
P
B ,
respectively, where we assume that both have length m.
3. Parameter Estimation: Using classical communication,
they compute the distance dPE = d(Y PEA , Y
PE
B ) as in (6)
and check if dPE ≤ d0. If this does not hold they abort
the entire protocol. Otherwise, they proceed with the
protocol and compute the second moment of the dis-
tance V PEd = d2(Y
PE
A , Y
PE
B ) according to (7). Moreover,
they individually compute the average second moments
of all their phase measurements V PEYA = m2(Y
P
A ) and
V PEYB = m2(Y
P
B ) according to (8).
4. Classical Post-Processing They run a classical post-
processing protocol as described in Section II B by ap-
plying first a one-way reverse reconciliation protocol
and secondly hash the corrected raw keys XcA and XB
to final keys SA and SB of length `.
The crucial point is now to obtain a tight bound on the pos-
sible number of secure bits ` one can generate by the above
protocol. Such a bound relies always on a set of assumptions.
Such assumptions can, for instance, be a restriction on the at-
tacks of the eavesdropper or simplifications used to model the
experimental setup. We thus start, with a detailed description
of our assumptions before presenting the key length formula.
We always assume that Alice’s and Bob’s laboratory are se-
cure and closed, that is, no unwanted information leaks from
their laboratory. It is further very important to assume that all
random numbers used for the basis choice and the classical
post-processing are truly random and independent. This im-
plies for instance that Alice’s and Bob’s basis choice are ran-
dom and independent which is crucial for the security. While
these assumptions are at the ground of most of the security
analysis the following are specific for our measurement setup
and security proof.
(A) Assumptions. We assume that Bob’s sequential mea-
surement of the values in X are independent and cor-
respond to perfect amplitude and phase measurements
of the intervals Ik defined in Section III A. Hence, they
can be modeled by integration of the spectrum of one-
mode amplitude and phase operators with perfect phase
5difference of pi/2 [35]. The same applies to Bob’s test
measurement performed in T (α, T ).
We note that (A) includes the assumption that the local
phase reference used by Bob is trusted. This can be prac-
tically justified by either monitoring the phase reference or
generating it independently directly on Bob’s side. For pos-
sible attacks on the local oscillator and countermeasures see,
for instance, [5]. We emphasize that we do not make any as-
sumptions on Eve’s attacks and that there are no requirements
on Alice’s measurement device. The latter is sometimes re-
ferred to as one-sided device independent [36].
As we will discuss in details in Section IV, security will be
inferred from the uncertainty principle with quantum mem-
ory for continuous variable systems [19]. The principle says
that Eve’s information about the amplitude measurements is
bounded by an overlap term of Bob’s measurements expressed
by
c(δ) ≈ δ2/2pi , (9)
and the uncertainty of Alice about Bob’s phase measurement.
The latter can be estimated using the distance d0 and the func-
tion
γ(t) = (t+
√
1 + t2)
( t√
1 + t2 − 1
)t
. (10)
Moreover, we use the test T (α, T ) to upper bound the prob-
ability that Bob measures an amplitude or phase quadrature
larger than M by (see equation (32))
nΓ(M,T, α) ∝ n exp ( − (µM − α)2
T (1 + λ)/2
)
(11)
where µ =
√
1−T
2T . Hence, the probability can be made suf-
ficiently small by tuning the parameters α, T , and M . Using
large deviation bounds for the statistical estimation of the raw
key sample we then obtain the following bound on the key
length.
Theorem 1. Let us consider the above protocol with parame-
ters (Ntot, r, δ,M, α, d0) and assume that the conditions in (A)
are satisfied. We further assume that the reconciliation proto-
col broadcasts `IR bits of classical information and the cor-
rectness test is passed for two-universal hash functions onto
an alphabet of size 1/c. Then, if the protocol passes, an c-
correct and s-secret key of length
n[log
1
c(δ)
− log γ(d0 + µ)]− `IR − log 1
21c
+ 2, (12)
can be extracted, where
µ =
√
2 log ξ−1
(n+ k)σ∗
k
√
n
+
4(M/δ) log ξ−1
3
n+ k
nk
, (13)
with
σ2∗ =
k
N
(V PEd −
k
N
(dPE)2) +
k
N
(
V PEYA + V
PE
YB + 2
ν
δ2
)
+ 2
k
N
√
(V PEYA +
ν
δ2
)(V PEYB +
ν
δ2
) , (14)
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FIG. 2. The plot shows the key rate `/Ntot for squeezing and anti-
squeezing of 11dB and 16dB and reconciliation efficency β = 0.95
depending on the number of signals Ntot. Bob’s total losses ηB
are 0.45 (solid line), 0.50 (dashed line) and 0.55 (dash-dotted line).
Since the source is assumed to be in Alice’s laboratory her losses are
set to ηA = 0. We set the excess noise ηex = 0.01, the security
parameters to s = c = 10−9, and the test parameters to T = 0.99
and α = 28.
for the smallest ν for which
ξ =
(
s − 1 − 2
√
2n Γ(M,T, α)
)2
(15)
− 2 exp
(
− 2(ν/M)2 nm
2
(n+m)(m+ 1)
)
is positive and 1 − 2
√
1− pnE < s. In the case that there is
no ν such that ξ is positive or 1 − 2
√
2Γ(M,T, α) < s is
not satisfied, the key length is 0.
The proof of the above theorem will be given in Section IV.
Before that we present some estimates of the obtained key
rates for experimentally feasible parameters.
C. Discussion of Key Rates
For the following, we consider a two-mode squeezed state
with squeezing λsq and antisqueezing λasq given by
Γ =
(
ΓA Γcor
Γcor ΓB
)
, (16)
where ΓA = ΓB = a1I and Γcor =
√
a2 − b2Z with a =
1
2 (10
λsq
10 + 10
λasq
10 ), b = 10
λasq−λsq
20 and Z = diag(1,−1). The
fiber losses of the channel are simulated by mixing the sig-
nal with vacuum at a beam splitter. We quantify the losses
on Alice’s and Bob’s arm by ηA and ηB which specifies the
reflectivity of the beam splitter, and thus, the amount of vac-
uum in the outgoing signal. We further include excess noise
ηex modeled as a classical Gaussian noise channel acting on
the variances of quadratures as V 7→ V + ηextVvac with t the
transmittance of the channel and Vvac the variance of the vac-
uum (see, e.g., [3, 37]). This transforms the covariance matrix
in (16) to(
η¯AΓA + (ηA + ηexη¯A)Γvac
√
η¯Aη¯B Γcor√
η¯Aη¯B Γcor η¯BΓB + (ηB + ηexη¯B)Γvac
)
(17)
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FIG. 3. The plot shows the key rate `/Ntot for squeezing and anti-
squeezing of 11dB and 16dB and reconciliation efficiency β = 0.90
depending on the number of signals Ntot. Bob’s total losses ηB are
0.40 (solid line), 0.45 (dashed line) and 0.50 (dash-dotted line). The
other parameters are as in Figure 2.
where η¯A = 1 − ηA, similar η¯B and Γvac denotes the covari-
ance matrix of the one-mode vacuum.
In the protocol, the scaling factors for Alice’s measurement
tq and tp have to be adjusted. In an experiment, tp should be
chosen such that the distance dPE is small. A convenient way
for that is to determine Q˜A and P˜A such that the second mo-
ments of Alice’s and Bob’s (continuous) amplitude and phase
measurements match. These values can be determined locally
and communicated in the classical post-processing step.
The important parameter of the protocol that is directly re-
lated to the state is d0, which should be chosen such that with
high probability the distance dPE computed for many samples
of the Gaussian state given by the covariance matrix (17) is
smaller than d0.
The leakage in the reconciliation protocol `IR is set to [13]
`IR = H(XB)− βI(XB : XA) , (18)
where H(XB) denotes the Shannon entropy of XB , I(XA :
XB) the mutual information between XA and XB , and β the
efficiency of the reconciliation protocol. The efficiency in the
Shannon limit is β = 1, while β < 1 for any finite n.
It is now important that the protocol is robust, that is, it
passes with high probability if no eavesdropper is presence.
This means that the test T (α, T ) has to pass with high proba-
bility for the above two-mode squeezed state. The probability
that T (α, T ) fails can be easily upper bounded by (see in-
equality (38))
√
8piσtNtote−α
2/(2σ2t ) (19)
where σt is the maximum of the standard deviations of the
outcome distributions of qt1 and pt2 . Hence, by setting
α =
√
2σ2t ln(
√
8piσtNtot/T ) we ensure that the T (α, T )
fails with probability smaller than T . Depending on α and
T , we then choose M such that 2
√
2nΓ(α, T,M) = 2 is
smaller than s.
We define the key rate as `/Ntot where ` is taken as in (12)
and optimized over the probability r for choosing amplitude
or phase. For that we simply express n, k, and m in terms of
Ntot and r. We further optimize the key rate over the spacing
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FIG. 4. The key rate is plotted against the distance for Ntot = 109,
squeezing and antisqueezing of 11dB and 16dB and reconciliation
efficiency β of 0.95 (solid line), 0.90 (dashed line) and 0.85 (dash-
dotted line). We assumed losses of 0.20dB per km plus 0.05 coupling
losses. All the other parameters are as in Figure 2.
δ under the constraint 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0.01 to account for the reso-
lution of the detector. The security parameters are chosen as
s = c = 10
−9. Moreover, we set T = 10−9, T = 0.99 and
2 = s/10 for which we find that α ≤ 28 and M ≤ 8000 in
units of ~ = 2 for relevant values of Ntot and realistic squeez-
ing strengths.
In Figure 2 and 3 we plotted the key rate against the to-
tal number of exchanged signals Ntot for a reconciliation ef-
ficiency β = 0.95 and β = 0.9, respectively. The squeez-
ing and antisqueezing is chosen as λsq = 11 and λasq = 16
which has experimentally been achieved in the laboratory [38]
at 1550nm. Note that this squeezing values already include
the efficiency of the homodyne detection. We further set the
excess noise to ηex = 0.01 in the plots. We note that a recon-
ciliation efficiency of about 0.9 is more realistic with current
non-binary error correction codes. The maximal amount of
losses to still obtain a secure key rate is slightly above 55%
for β = 0.95 and 50% for β = 0.9. The key rate in depen-
dence of the distance for different values of β is plotted in
Figure 4. For that we used a loss rate of 0.20 dB per km and
additional coupling losses of 0.05. We see that for the same
squeezing rates as above and an error correction efficiency of
0.95, a positive key rate can be obtained for over 16 km.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Estimation of Eve’s Information by the Uncertainty
Principle with Quantum Memories
The first step of the security proof is the same as in [17]
except that the roles of Alice and Bob are exchanged and that
the basis choices for parameter estimation and key generation
are different. We start with the definition of the min- and max-
entropies.
Let X be a random variable over a countable set X dis-
tributed according to px. Suppose further that X is corre-
lated to a quantum system B associated with Hilbert space
HB and corresponding state space S(HB) = {ρB | ρB ≥
0, tr ρB = 1}. The min-entropy of a classical quantum state
7ρXB =
∑
x px|x〉〈x|⊗ρxB with ρxB ∈ S(HB) is defined as the
negative logarithm of the optimal success probability to guess
X given access to the quantum memory B [39]. In formulas,
this is
Hmin(X|B)ρ = − log
(
sup
{Ex}
∑
x
px tr(Exρ
x
B)
)
, (20)
where the supremum is taken over all positive operator valued
measures (POVM) {Ex}, i.e., Ex ≥ 0 and
∑
xEx = 1I. A
further entropy related to the min-entropy via the uncertainty
relation is the max-entropy which is defined as
Hmax(X|B) = 2 log
(
sup
σB
∑
x
√
F (pxρxB , σB)
)
, (21)
where the supremum runs over all states σB ∈ S(HB) and
F (ρ, σ) = (tr |√ρ√σ|)2 denotes the fidelity.
The corresponding smooth min- and max-entropy are then
obtained by optimizing the min- and max-entropy over nearby
states. The closeness of states is measured with the puri-
fied distance P(ρ, σ) = √1− F (ρ, σ) [40]. We also allow
for sub-normalized states defining the smooth min- and max-
entropy as
Hmin(X|B)ρ = sup
ρ˜XB
Hmin(X|B)ρ˜ , (22)
Hmax(X|B)ρ = inf
ρ˜XB
Hmax(X|B)ρ˜ , (23)
where the supremum and infimum are taken over sub-
normalized states, i.e., ρ˜XB ≥ 0 and tr ρ˜XB ≤ 1, with
P(ρXB , ρ˜XB) ≤ .
Let us consider now the situation in the protocol. According
to (4), we have to bound the smooth min-entropy of the state
associated with the raw key of Bob XB and the system of Eve
E. Suppose that ρAnBnE denotes the state of the n modes
on which the amplitude measurements for the raw key gener-
ation are performed conditioned on the event that the protocol
passes. The state ρXBE of XB and E can then be obtained by
measuring the amplitudes of Bn according to the discretiza-
tion induced by the intervals {Ik}. But since the intervals I1
and I2M/δ are of infinite length any uncertainty relation will
get trivial for the associated measurements.
In order to avoid this problem, let us introduce phase and
amplitude measurement with discretization {I˜k}k∈Z, where
I˜k = (M + (k − 1)δ,−M + kδ], k ∈ Z .
We note that I˜k = Ik for k = 2, 3, ..., 2M/δ − 1. We denote
by X˜B (Y˜
key
B ) the classical random variable corresponding
to Bob’s discretized amplitude (phase) measurement outcome
k ∈ Z. Moreover, the classical quantum state of X˜B (Y˜ keyB )
and AnE is denoted by ρX˜BAnE (ρY˜ keyB AnE). As we will see
below, the energy test assures that the purified distance be-
tween ρXBE and ρX˜BE as well as ρY keyB An and ρY˜ keyB An are
small.
Let us assume for now that P(ρXBE , ρX˜BE) andP(ρY keyB An , ρY˜ keyB An) are smaller than ˜. We then find that
H+˜min(XB |E)ρ ≥ Hmin(X˜B |E)ρ , (24)
H+˜max(Y˜B |An)ρ ≤ Hmax(Y keyB |An)ρ , (25)
which is a simple consequence of the definition of smooth
min- and max-entropy. The uncertainty relation in [31] then
provides the inequality [41]
Hmin(X˜B |E)ρ ≥ −n log c(δ)−Hmax(Y˜B |An)ρ , (26)
with
c(δ) =
1
2pi
δ2 · S(1)0
(
1,
δ2
4
)2
, (27)
where S(1)0 (·, x) is the 0th radial prolate spheroidal wave func-
tion of the first kind. In the regime of interest δ ≤ 1, c(δ) can
be approximated as in (9).
If we combine now the inequalities (24), (25) and (26), we
obtain from the formula in (4) a lower bound on the key length
given by
−n log c(δ)−Hmax(Y keyB |An)ρ− `IR− log
1
21c
+ 2 , (28)
where  ≤ (1 − s)/(2ppass)− 2˜. In the next section we use
the energy test to give a bound on ˜.
B. Failure Probabiltiy of the Energy Test
The goal of this section is to give a bound on the purified
distance of ρXBE and ρX˜BE as well as ρY keyB An and ρY˜ keyB An . It
turns out that they can be bounded by the probability that the
energy test is passed although an amplitude or phase larger
than M is measured. We start with ρXBE and ρX˜BE .
In a first step we compute that
P(ρXBE , ρX˜BE) ≤
√
1− Pr[∧i{|qi| ≤M}|ρAnBnE ]2
(29)
where {|qi| ≤ M} denotes the event that the absolute value
of the continuous amplitude measurement of Bob’s ith mode
is smaller than M . This follows directly from the properties
of the fidelity of a classical quantum state
F (ρXBE , ρX˜BE)
1/2
=
2M/δ−1∑
k=2
F (pkρ
k
E , pkρ
k
E)
1/2
+
∑
k=1,2M/δ
F (pkρ
k
E + qkσ
k
E , pkρ
k
E)
1/2
≥
2M/δ−1∑
k=1
F (pkρ
k
E , pkρ
k
E)
1/2
=
2M/δ−1∑
k=1
pk ,
8where pk is the probability of measuring an amplitude in the
interval I˜k, ρkE the corresponding conditional state of Eve,
and qi, σiE for i = 1, 2M/δ similar for amplitude mea-
surements smaller than −M and larger than M , respectively.
The inequality follows from F (ρ + σ, ρ)1/2 ≥ F (ρ, ρ)1/2
for any two non-normalized states ρ and σ. Note now that
the last line of the above computation is nothing else than
Pr[∧i{|qi| ≤ M}|ρAnBnE ] such that the bound (29) follows
from the definition of the purified distance.
We then denote the probability that Bob measures an am-
plitude larger than M conditioned that the protocol passes by
pfail = Pr[¬ ∧i {|qi| ≤M}|pass] (30)
= 1− Pr[∧i{|qi| ≤M}|ρAnBnE ] , (31)
where the second inequality follows since ρAnBnE is the state
conditioned that the protocol passes. Using ¬ ∧i {|qi| ≤
M} = ∨i{|qi| > M} and Bayes theorem, we obtain by sim-
ple manipulations
pfail =
1
ppass
Pr[∨i{|qi| > M} ∧ pass]
≤ 1
ppass
∑
i
Pr[|qi| > M ∧ pass]
≤ 1
ppass
∑
i
Pr[|qi| > M ∧ |qt1i | ≤ α] ,
where the last inequality holds since pass of the protocol im-
plies that the energy test is passed which implies that |qt1i | ≤
α. We now bound each term individually by
Pr
[|qi| > M ∧ |qt1i | ≤ α]
=
∫
|x|≥M
Pr[qi = x] Pr
[|qt1i | ≤ α ∣∣ qi = x] dx
≤ sup
|x|≥M
Pr
[|qt1i | ≤ α ∣∣ qi = x] ,
where the supremum in the last line refers to the essential
supremum.
We then show the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let us assume that the energy test T (α, T ) is
passed and set µ =
√
1−T
2T and λ = (
2T−1
T )
2. If α ≤ µM ,
then it holds that sup|x|≥M Pr[|qt1i | ≤ α | qi = x] is upper
bounded by
Γ(M,T, α) :=
√
1 + λ+
√
1 + λ−1
2
exp
( − (µM − α)2
T (1 + λ)/2
)
.
(32)
Proof. In the following, we suppress the index i since the ar-
gument applies independently to all possible incoming modes.
We further label the different modes in the energy test setup as
in Figure 1. We are interested in computing Λx = Pr[|qt1i | ≤
α| qi = x] and without loss of generality we can assume that
x ≥ 0.
In order to compute Λx, we write the characteristic function
χout of the output state of modes s′, t1, and t2 in terms of the
characteristic function χin of the input state of modes a, b, and
s. Let B be the matrix describing the linear transformation of
the coordinates of the phase space induced by the beam split-
ters, that is, rout = Brin, where rin = (qa, pa, qb, pb, qs, ps)
and rout = (qs′ , ps′ , qt1 , pt1 , qt2 , pt2). For the following it
will be important that qs′ =
√
Tqs +
√
1− Tqa and qt1 =√
1/2qb +
√
T/2qa +
√
(1− T )/2qs.
We then have that χout(rout) = χin(B−1rout), where
χin(rin) = χvac(qa, pa)χvac(qb, pb)χs(qs, ps) has product
form. Integrating over all output modes under the condition
|qs′ | ≤ α and changing variables rin = Brout, we obtain that
the probability Pr[|qt1i | ≤ α] is given by∫
A˜
χvac(qa)χvac(qb)χs(qs) dqa dqb dqs , (33)
where χ∗(q) =
∫
dpχ∗(q, p) and A˜ is determined by the con-
dition
|qt1 | = |
√
1/2qb +
√
T/2qa +
√
(1− T )/2qs| ≤ α . (34)
In order to condition on qs′ = x, we set χs(qs) = δ(qs −
[
√
1/Tx+
√
(1− T )/Tqa]) where δ denotes the Dirac delta
distribution and we used that q′s =
√
Tqs+
√
1− Tqa. Hence,
integrating over qs results in
Λx ≤
∫
A
χvac(qa)χvac(qb) dqa dqb , (35)
where A = {(qa, qb)| d1qa + d2qb + µx ≤ α}. Here, we
obtainedA from A˜ by setting qs =
√
1/Tx+
√
(1− T )/Tqa
and removing the absolute value.
In order to bound the integral in (35), we split the area A
into A1 = A ∩ {qa ≥ 0} and A2 = A\A1. If we set l(qb) =
max{0, 1/d1(µx−α−d2qb)}, we get that the integration over
A1 amounts to
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dqb e−q
2
b/2
∫ ∞
l(qb)
dqa e−q
2
a/2 (36)
≤ 1
2
√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dqb e−q
2
b/2−l(q2)2/2 , (37)
where the inequality follows from∫ ∞
l
e−q
2/2dq ≤
√
pi/2 e−l
2/2 (38)
for l ≥ 0. A straightforward calculation of (37) gives
1
2
√
1 + λ−1 exp
(
− (µx− α)
2
T (1 + λ)/2
)
. (39)
In order to compute the integral over A2, we note first that
A2 = {(qa, qb)|qa ≤ 0 , −∞ < qb ≤ u(qa)} with u(qa) =
1/d2[d1qa − (µx− α)]. Using that u(qa) ≤ 0 for all qa ≤ 0,
we can apply again (38) to bound
1
2pi
∫ 0
−∞
dqa e−q
2
a/2
∫ u(qa)
−∞
dqb e−q
2
b/2 (40)
≤ 1
2
√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dqa e−q
2
a/2−u(qa)2/2 , (41)
9where we also extended the integration over qa to run over the
whole real line. Finally, the same calculation as before shows
that (41) is given by
1
2
√
1 + λ exp
(
− (µx− α)
2
T (1 + λ)/2
)
. (42)
We can thus conclude that Λx is bounded by the sum of (39)
and (42). Finally, the supremum over x is attained for x = M
which completes the proof.
By means of Lemma 1, we can now bound pfail ≤
nΓ(M,T, α)/ppass. Using the relation in (29) together with
(1− pfail)2 ≥ 1− 2pfail, we finally arrive at
P(ρXBE , ρX˜BE) ≤
√
2n Γ(M,T, α)
ppass
. (43)
Let us now consider the case of ρY keyB An and ρY˜ keyB An . It is
easy to see that the same strategy can be applied as in the pre-
vious situation. This is simply based on the fact that |pt2 | ≤ α
if the test T (α,M) is passed. Hence, following the exactly
same steps for the phase measurements as before for ampli-
tude, we find that also
P(ρY keyB An , ρY˜ keyB An) ≤
√
2n Γ(M,T, α)
ppass
, (44)
holds.
Summarizing the above arguments, we have thus shown
that (28) is a lower bound on the key rate if we set
˜ =
√
2n Γ(M,T, α)
ppass
. (45)
C. Statistical Estimation of the Max-Entropy
The goal of this section is to use the information from the
parameter estimation step to upper bound the smooth max-
entropy Hmax(Y
key
B |An)ω . In a first step, we apply Alice’s
scaled and discretized phase measurement to An mapping it
to a classical outcome Y keyA also in Xn. Using now that the
smooth max-entropy can only increase under processing of
the side-information [31, 40], we obtain that
Hmax(Y
key
B |An)ρ ≤ Hmax(Y keyB |Y keyA )ρ . (46)
We next note that it has been shown in [17] that if X and
Y are random variables on Xn ×Xn distributed according to
QXY for which PrQ[d(X,Y ) ≥ d] ≤ 2 holds, it follows that
Hmax(X|Y )Q ≤ n log γ(d) , (47)
with γ as defined in (10). In order to apply this result to
bound Hmax(Y
key
B |Y keyA )ρ, we have to find an estimation of
dkey = d(Y keyB , Y
key
A ) that holds with probability 
2. For that
we use a large deviation bound and estimate the probability
that dkey = d(Y keyB , Y
key
A ) is larger than d0 + µ where con-
ditioned on pass d0 ≥ dPE = d(XPEA , XPEB ). But since the
alphabet size scales with M and is thus very large, a direct
application of a large deviation bound would result in a large
failure probability. This can be avoided by employing a strat-
egy that splits the problem into two estimation steps.
In the first step, we bound in Lemma 2 the probability that
m2(Y
key
A ) is larger than V
PE
YA
+ ν, respectively, that m2(Y
key
B )
is larger than V PEYB + ν. This will be done using Serfling’s
large deviation bound [42]. Given that m2(Y
key
A ) ≤ V PEYA + ν
and m2(Y
key
B ) ≤ V PEYB + ν, we can bound the average variance
of the distance d(Y keyB , Y
key
A ) on Y
key
B × Y keyA , and thus, of
the total population Y totA × Y totB formed by Y keyB × Y keyA and
Y PEB × Y PEA . Indeed, denoting N = n + k, we can bound the
average variance of the population by
σ2 =
1
N
∑
i
|(Y totA )i − (Y totB )i|2 − d(Y totB , Y totA )2
≤ k
N
V PEd +
1
N
∑
i
|(Y keyA )i − (Y keyB )i|2 − (
k
N
dPE)2
≤ k
N
(V PEd −
k
N
(dPE)2) +
1
N
∑
i
(|(Y keyA )i|+ |(Y keyB )i|)2
where we used that dtot = kN d
PE + nN d
key. Apply-
ing the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can then bound∑
i(|(Y keyA )i|+ |(Y keyB )i|)2 by
k
(
m2(Y
key
A ) + m2(Y
key
B ) +
(
m2(Y
key
A )m2(Y
key
B )
) 1
2
)
. (48)
Hence, given that m2(Y
key
A ) ≤ V PEYA + ν/δ2 and m2(Y
key
B ) ≤
V PEYB + ν/δ
2 holds, we find that σ ≤ σ∗ with σ∗ as defined
in (14).
In the second step, we bound in Lemma 3 the probability
that dkey = d(Y keyB , Y
key
A ) is larger than d
PE +µ for a fixed and
bounded σ. Combining these two steps, we can then estimate
Pr[dkey ≥ d0 + µ|pass] ≤ Pr[dkey ≥ dPE + µ|pass]
≤ 1
ppass
Pr[dkey ≥ dPE + µ]
≤ 1
ppass
(
Pr[m2(Y
key
A ) > V
PE
YA + ν]
+ Pr[m2(Y
key
B ) > V
PE
YB + ν]
+ Pr[dkey ≥ dPE + µ|C]
)
(49)
where C denotes the condition m2(Y
key
B ) ≤ V PEYB + ν and
m2(Y
key
A ) ≤ V PEP˜A .
Lemma 2. Let Y be a string in Xn+m and Y P be a ran-
dom sample without replacement from Y of length m with
m2(Y P ) = V PEY . Then, for the average second moment of
the remaining sample Y key of length n, holds that
Pr[m2(Y key) ≥ V PEY + ν] ≤ exp
( −2ν2δ4nm2
M4(n+m)(m+ 1)
)
.
(50)
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Proof. The proof is similar to strategies applied in [17, 43] and
based on a large deviation bound for random sampling without
replacement by Serfling [42]. Denoting the population mean
of the variance by VY = m2(Y ) and V
key
Y = m2(Y
key), we
have that
nV keyY +mV
PE
Y = (n+m)VY . (51)
The large deviation bound in [42] implies that Pr[V keyY ≥
VY + ν˜] is upper bounded by
exp
(− 2ν˜2n(n+m)
(M/δ)4(m+ 1)
)
. (52)
Since the bound is independent of VY , it is not necessary
to know the actual value of VY . Indeed, using the relation
in (51), we obtain the desired bound
Pr[V keyY ) ≥ V PEY + ν] ≤ Pr[V keyY ≥ VY +
m
m+ n
ν]
≤ exp ( −2ν2nm2
(M/δ)4(n+m)(m+ 1)
)
.
Lemma 3. Let Y totA × Y totB be in (X × X )N with dtot =
d(Y totA , Y
tot
B ) and Y
PE
A × Y PEB a random sample from it with-
out replacement of length k with dPE = d(Y PEA , Y
PE
B ). Let
further σ2 =
∑
i |(Y totA )i − (Y totB )i|2 − d2tot be the average
variance of the population. Then, for dkey = d(Y keyA , Y
key
B ) of
the remaining sample Y keyA ×Y keyB of length n = N −k, holds
that
Pr[dkey ≥ dPE + ν] ≤ exp
( −µ2n(k/N)2
2σ2 + 4µ/3(k/N)(M/δ)
)
.
(53)
Proof. The bound follows directly from Bernstein’s inequality
Pr[dkey ≥ dtot + µ˜] ≤ exp (− nµ˜2
2σ2 + 2µ|X |/3
)
, (54)
which, as shown by Hoeffding [44], also holds for sampling
without replacement. Using that ndkey + kdPE = Ndtot
and that |X | = 2M/δ, a straigthforward calculation results
in (53).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. For that we observe
that from (47) follows that
Hmax(Y
key
B |Y keyA )ρ ≤ γ(d0 + µ) , (55)
if µ is such that (49) is smaller than 2. Hence, we use
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 to bound (49) and set the expression
equal to 2, where  ≤ (1−s)/(2ppass)−2˜ with ˜ as in (45)
(c.f. (28)). Solving the equation for µ and using ppass ≤ 1,
we obtain an upper bound on µ by (13). This concludes the
security proof.
V. PERFORMANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF SECURITY
PROOFS BASED ON THE EXTENDED UNCERTAINTY
PRINCIPLE
In Section IV A, we have seen that the main ingredient in
the security proof is the uncertainty relation with quantum
memory for smooth min- and max-entropy (c.f. (26))
Hmin(Q
δ,n
B |E)ρ +Hmax(P δ,nB |An)ρ ≥ −n log c(δ) . (56)
Here, we denote by Qδ,nB and P
δ,n
B the classical random vari-
able induced by an arbitrary amplitude and phase measure-
ment with discretization into intervals of equal length δ. Thus,
the tightness of the bound on the optimal key rate (4) crucially
depends on how tight the uncertainty relation is for the state
given in the protocol. Since we are interested in optimality
in the following, and as such in the question of how much
key can be extracted under normal working condition, we can
assume that Eve is absent for the moment. Then, the state
is in good approximation given by the n-fold tensor product
of identical Gaussian states described by a covariance matrix
depending on coupling and channel losses as well as excess
noise as described in (17).
But even though we can assume that the state takes this
simple form it is still very hard to compute the correspond-
ing smooth min- and max-entropy directly. We circumvent
this problem by using a further approximation. In particu-
lar, we can use the asymptotic equipartition property in in-
finite dimensions [45], saying that the smooth min-entropy
1
nH

min(Q
δ,n
B |E)ρ⊗n can be approximated up to a correction
O( 1√
n
) by the von Neumann entropy H(QδB |E)ρ. Here,
ρQδBE is given by measuring the amplitude with a spacing
δ on a single copy. The same applies for the smooth max-
entropy such that 1nH

max(P
δ,n
B |A)ρ⊗n can be approximated
by H(P δB |A)ρ.
Furthermore, if we choose δ small enough we can approx-
imate the von Neumann entropy of the discrete distribution
over intervals of length δ by the differential von Neumann en-
tropy [19]
H(QδB |E)ρ ≈ h(QB |E)− log δ , (57)
where h(QB |E) denotes the differential quantum conditional
entropy of the continuous amplitude measurement. Similarly,
we have that H(P δB |E)ρ ≈ h(PB |A) − log δ. Using that
c(δ) ≈ δ2/(2pi), we can thus conclude that in the asymptotic
limit inequality (56) is well approximated by
h(QB |E) + h(PB |A) ≥ log 2pi . (58)
Hence, we can qualitatively investigate the tightness of (56)
by considering inequality (58). For our situation, the latter one
can now easily be analyzed as the differential quantum con-
ditional entropy can be computed for Gaussian classical and
quantum states. In the following, we always choose system E
as the Gaussian purification of the Gaussian state between A
andB. In [19], it was shown that (58) gets approximately tight
for a two-mode squeezed state without losses and squeezing
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FIG. 5. The gap between l.h.s. and r.h.s. of the uncertainty relations
in (60) (solid line) and (58) (dashed line) are plotted for a two-mode
squeezed state with squeezing and antisqueezing of 11dB and 16dB
against the losses on Bob’s mode. The losses on Alice’s mode and the
excess noise are set to 0. The gap for (60) (solid line) is the amount
by which the bound on the key rate reduces in the asymptotic limit
compared with the optimal key rate.
above 10 dB. However, tightness holds only conditioned on
Alice’s quantum system but not after she performs the am-
plitude measurements. The data processing inequality only
ensures that
h(PB |A) ≤ h(PB |PA) , (59)
but equality does not always hold, even for the optimal mea-
surement on A. Unfortunately, in our case it turns out that
the loss through the data processing inequality is substantial
(see Figure 5) such that the optimality of the bound has to be
analyzed for the inequality after applying the data processing
inequality
h(QB |E) + h(PB |PA) ≥ log 2pi . (60)
In Figure 5, we plotted the tightness of (58) and (60) for the
same parameters of the state for which the key rates are plotted
in Section III C. We see that unfortunately, the gap between
the left hand side and right hand side of (58) and (60) increases
for high losses. We further note that an increase of the initial
squeezing does hardly change the gap for losses above 30%.
This gap severely limits the tolerated noises also causing
that the finite-key rates presented in Section III C vanish for
high losses. We can quantitatively analyze the effect of the
untightness of the uncertainty relation on the key rate by cal-
culating the asymptotic key rate (4). In this regime all the sta-
tistical estimation errors disappear and collective attacks are
as strong as coherent attacks [10]. We find for the asymptotic
key rate by using that `IR = H(P δB |P δA) for perfect error cor-
rection and (57) the simple formula
rUR = log 2pi − 2h(PB |PA) . (61)
In contrast, the asymptotically optimal key rate given by the
Devetak-Winter formula [46] is
rOpt = h(PB |E)− h(PB |PA) , (62)
where we also applied the approximation in (57). In Figure 6,
we compare the finite-key rate from (12) with the asymptotic
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FIG. 6. The loss dependence of the finite-key rate for Ntot = 1011
(straight line) is compared with the asymptotic key rate rUR (dashed),
the optimal key rate rOpt (dashed-dotted), and the asymptotic key rate
for direct reconciliation rDR (dotted). The squeezing and antisqueez-
ing is set to 11dB and 16dB and Alice’s coupling losses as well as the
excess noise to 0. The reconciliation efficiency of the non-asymptotic
key rate is β = 0.95 and the other parameters are as in Figure 2.
key rates rUR and rOpt for the same parameters as in Figure 2
except that the excess noise is set equal to 0. We see that even
the asymptotic key rate rUR vanishes for moderate losses of
66%. We remark that even if the squeezing is arbitrarily high
and the losses in Alice’s mode are 0% the maximally tolerated
losses are not exceeding 75%.
In Figure 6, we also plotted the asymptotic key rate ob-
tained via the extended uncertainty principle if using a direct
reconciliation protocol. In this situation the asymptotic key
rate is rDR = log 2pi − 2h(PA|PB). The plot shows that we
have obtained a finite-key rate in the case of reverse reconcil-
iation for losses much larger than what is ultimately tolerated
in the case of direct reconciliation.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a security proof against coherent attacks
including finite-size effects for a reverse reconciliation con-
tinuous variable QKD protocol. The protocol is based on the
generation of two-mode squeezed states and homodyne detec-
tion. Security for transmission losses of up to 50% for exper-
imental parameters demonstrated in [38] have been certified
under realistic assumptions. A remaining challenging point in
an implementation of the presented protocol will be the rec-
onciliation protocol. However, recently some advances have
been made in non-binary error correction codes such that rec-
onciliation efficiencies above 90% seem realistic.
We further investigated on the tightness of the security anal-
ysis based on the uncertainty relation with quantum memory
and showed that even in the asymptotic limit the maximally
tolerated losses are bounded. The reason for that is that the
uncertainty relation is not perfectly tight and for high losses
the trade-off between Eve’s knowledge and the correlations
between Bob and Alice gets very small. Hence, for the high
loss regime a very tight bound on Eve’s information is crucial.
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